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Abstract  
 
Over the past two decades, conditional cash transfer (CCT) has become one of the most 
widespread approaches to social development in Latin America. Spurred in large part by 
the evident and immediate success of Mexico’s CCT initiative, a multitude of countries 
began to invest heavily in this strategy hoping to reduce poverty and inequality in the 
short and long run. This paper examines the relationship between CCT program breadth 
and poverty, inequality, and secondary school enrollment over a thirteen year span in 
order to determine whether or not programs with the largest coverage were the most 
efficient. This question is of grave importance being that as many as eighteen countries 
are betting on CCT as a means in sustainably breaking poverty cycles. This thesis finds 
that conditional cash transfer has been exceptionally successful in diminishing extreme 
poverty in Latin America. Furthermore, although result are inconclusive in terms of 
moderate poverty, secondary school enrollment, and inequality a trend analysis of 
fluctuations in poverty and inequality from 1997 to 2010 shows promising results as all 
development indicators appear to be in decline.   
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Introduction  
It is the belief of most that all individuals should be afforded a minimal level of 
well-being and social support. It follows that the both national governments and NGOs 
have made efforts to help individuals attain access to basic necessities such as water, 
housing, and education. In a majority of cases, this aid or welfare consists of granting 
needy individuals handouts, subsidies, and vouchers for them to have enough to live. 
However, many of these programs are flawed in that aid recipients can become dependent 
on these stipends. Additionally, although traditional forms of welfare help families reach 
a somewhat acceptable living standard, handouts often do little to help families rise above 
poverty permanently. Thus, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs offered a 
newfangled approach to the age old problem of poverty and inequality. Instead of 
distributing endowments to the neediest,   CCT allowances are conditional on the 
receivers’ actions. Namely, households are only rewarded if they fulfill a series of 
government enforced obligations. Although these differ among countries they often 
include: attending regular health checkups and enforcing school attendance by minors. 
By partaking in these forward-looking activities, families forcibly invest in escaping 
poverty permanently.  
 CCT theory rests on the assumption that building human capital is the only way 
for individuals to break poverty cycles. Families need to spend a portion of their profits in 
sustainable investments such as schooling and securities in order to develop their skills 
and grow their patrimony. However, low-income families are seldom able to retain 
enough disposable income to do so because the vast majority of their money is tied up in 
day-to-day expenses. These cash transfers, allow beneficiaries to better manage their 
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money. For example, cash grants enable households to forego their children’s incomes 
until they complete their schooling. Thereafter, conditional cash transfer aims to help 
both the current and the next generation by granting participants the tools to escape 
poverty permanently. 
 Overall, these efforts have had overwhelmingly positive results and have 
consequently become extremely popular. In 2011, 18 different Latin American countries 
were using CCT as a tool in their social policy scheme, covering as many as 135 million 
beneficiaries.1 This figure is especially surprising when considering the fact that the use 
of CCT as a means in poverty reduction is relatively new. Mexico, a pioneer in 
conditional transfer, only began experimenting with this approach in 1997. Mexico’s 
conditional cash transfer program Progresa grew exponentially in the years to come. 
Having experienced tangible success year to year, this program has remained in place for 
the last eighteen years and has become the government’s main social development 
initiative. By the end of 2014, over 6.1 million families were enrolled in the program.2   
 Due to the relative recency and experimental nature of conditional cash transfer a 
multitude of researchers sought to study the effects of these programs early on. This 
research focuses heftily on Mexico and Brazil as they were the first to implement CCT 
programs. Consequently, a wide range of studies were developed directly after Progresa 
was instated. A majority of these early studies, shed light on the program’s success in the 
1 Stampini, Marco, and Leopoldo Tornarolli. “The growth of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: did they go too far?”. No. 49. IZA Policy Paper, 2012. 
2 "Primer Informe De Labores 2012-2013." SEDESOL. Gobierno De Mexico, 30 Dec. 2012. Web. 6 Nov. 2015. 
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short term. In the case of Mexico, CCT has consistently increased food intake3 as well as 
primary and secondary school enrollment4 year to year. 
 However, much of the early research focuses on Progresa’s immediate effect in 
targeted communities. Thus, questions about the macroeconomic impact of the program 
and its long term sustainability arise. Being that a majority of Latin American CCT 
programs have only been in place since 2005, the case of Mexico is better suited to 
discuss the longer term effects of these programs. Additionally, Mexico’s Progresa is one 
of the largest conditional cash transfer programs in terms of coverage, further enhancing 
the viability of Mexico in studying CCT. In this case, extreme poverty has fallen 
drastically in the last few years but moderate poverty has remained constant within the 
last decade at around 45%. Furthermore, poverty as measured solely by income continues 
to rise.5 Consequently, after almost twenty years, conditional cash transfer programs 
might not be having their desired sustainable effect despite a consistent growth in budget.  
In order to further advance research on the long term impacts of conditional cash 
transfers, this thesis intends to study the impact that Oportunidades (formerly Progresa) 
as well as a myriad of different CCT initiatives in 17 Latin American Countries have had 
on nationwide inequality, secondary school enrollment and poverty rates. Although 
placing considerable emphasis on the Mexican CCT experience, this thesis aims to 
discern whether or not conditional cash transfer initiatives aided in providing Latin 
American countries with a sustainable solution in poverty reduction. In order to do so, 
3 Hoddinott, John, and Emmanuel Skoufias. "The impact of PROGRESA on food consumption." Economic 
development and cultural change 53.1 (2004): 37-61. 
4 Schultz, T. Paul. "School subsidies for the poor: evaluating the Mexican Progresa poverty program." Journal of 
development Economics 74.1 (2004): 199-250. 
5 Wilson, Christopher, and Gerardo Silva. "Mexico’s Latest Poverty Stats."Wilson Center International Institute for 
Scholars, Mexico Institute (2013). 
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this paper includes nationwide data on the percent total of the population that each of the 
programs benefited from year to year in order to assess the annual growth and coverage 
of the program. This data is coupled with a trend analysis of the national Gini coefficient 
from 1997, the program’s inception, and 2010. This will be complemented with data on 
secondary school enrollment and extreme and moderate poverty.  
While a large number of countries have employed conditional cash transfer some 
have invested in it more heavily than others. While some CCT programs reach around 
40% of the nation’s citizens, others only cover a mere 5% of the population. 
Consequently, if CCT programs are efficient in remedying poverty permanently, we 
would expect to see countries with the largest coverage to greatest drops in inequality and 
poverty and the heftiest increase in school enrollment. In order to capture the overall 
success of the program the paper includes a sum total of beneficiaries for each country. 
Furthermore, this paper includes the net change in Gini index, moderate and extreme 
poverty, and secondary school education from 1997 to 2010. These values are then 
regressed against each of the dependent variables to come up with four separate 
regressions.  
This paper concludes that counties that place the largest emphasis on conditional 
cash transfer were able to reduce extreme poverty by the widest margin. However, results 
were inconclusive in terms of inequality, moderate poverty, and secondary school 
enrollment. These results point to the fact that CCT programs have been extremely 
successful in aiding families that lagged behind the most in terms of development. This 
conclusion is compatible with the programs design being that it was initially conceived as 
a means to aid a nation’s poorest citizens in remote rural regions.  
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Mexico and Conditional Cash Transfer  
A History of Poverty and Inequality in Mexico 
 Mexico has long been characterized by the immense disparity in wealth among 
the upper and working class. This distinction is even more sweeping when comparing the 
rural poor and the wealthy urban class. Mexico City is one of the largest economies of 
Latin America and the world. With a GDP of over $411 billion in 2012, it stands as the 
eight wealthiest city in the world. Additionally, despite only encompassing a mere 0.1% 
of the countries surface, the Federal District (D.F.) is the largest contributor to the 
country’s GDP by a wide margin.  D.F. alone produces around 23.55% of the nation’s 
gross domestic product annually.6 Contrastingly, due to the limited non-urbanized space, 
D.F. contributes the least towards Mexico’s agriculture. This contrast is characteristic of 
Mexico proper. While the nation’s largest cities are highly westernized hubs of foreign 
investment, the rural communities are significantly less sophisticated.  Out of the 198 
million acres of Mexican land, a stunning 145 million are dedicated to agriculture. Even 
more striking, agriculture only comprises 4% of the national GDP.7  Thus, Mexicans 
living in rural areas are often marginalized. For decades, this lump of the population has 
suffered the worst living conditions. Additionally, the nation’s indigenous population has 
long been one of the most marginalized communities.   
 The disparity between urban and rural has pervaded the country for years. Poverty 
and the marginalization of the rural community have defined modern Mexican history. 
6 “The 10 Traits of Globally Fluent Metro Areas” The Brookings Institute and JP Morgan Chase. Brookings, 2014. 
Web. 6 Nov. 2015. 
7 De Janvry, Alain, and Elisabeth Sadoulet. "Rural poverty in Latin America: Determinants and exit paths." Food 
Policy 25.4 (2000): 389-409. 
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While the last hundred years saw the propulsion of Mexico into the western world. The 
nation’s poor, especially those inhabiting secluded rural areas were excluded from this 
growth and modernization. By the mid-1990s an estimated 24 percent of all households, 
or in other words around 30 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty. Rural 
areas housed a large number of the country’s poor. Consequently, approximately half of 
Mexico’s rural families lived in poverty. Conversely, only 14% of urban households were 
poor under the national standard.8  
Previous Efforts in Poverty Reduction 
 Before 1997, Mexico’s poverty reduction programs focused on improving food 
consumption, health status and education of the poor. These programs were generally run 
by a myriad of interconnected bureaucratic agencies. Although large sums of money had 
been invested in poverty alleviation, a large portion of the allotted budged was lost to 
both administrative costs and corruption. Moreover, bureaucratic agencies did a 
notoriously poor job in communicating with each other. Consequently, agencies often 
duplicated each other’s efforts and were inconsistent in identifying needy regions because 
they used different methodologies in making these determinations. Unfortunately, the 
government failed to document the progress of many of these efforts and thus their 
relative success remains unclear. However, it is certain that these organizations were 
often mismanaged and extremely inefficient.9  
8 Boltvinik, Julio. "Welfare, inequality, and poverty in Mexico, 1970-2000."Confronting development. Assessing 
Mexico's economic and social policy challenges (2003): 385-446. 
9 Levy, Santiago. Progress against poverty: sustaining Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007.   
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 Social welfare programs also lacked consistency. It was common practice for 
newly elected officials to eliminate their predecessor’s welfare programs. It was easy for 
them to do so since an overwhelming majority of initiatives failed to provide citizens 
with the ambitious results they promised. And thus, candidates would eliminate these 
alleged failures and once again set unattainable goals for the novel approaches they 
proposed. This endless cycle perpetuated the failure of such programs. Government plans 
were not allowed enough time to develop properly and their focus on short-term goals 
failed to prioritize the long-term interests of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, Mexican 
Presidents are limited to a six-year term and thus the at large success of their initiative is 
somewhat less important. This lack of commitment coupled with the evident 
administrative shortcomings of welfare initiatives led to the creation of a myriad of 
inefficient and redundant agencies.  
By the mid-1990s, Mexico’s federal government ran fifteen different food subsidy 
programs: eleven targeted urban and rural populations while four were generalized.10 
These programs were administrated by ten different government regulated ministries.  As 
is characteristic of the Mexican bureaucracy before the 1990s, the results of these 
programs remain largely untested. Nevertheless, it is clear that they were poorly 
strategized. This is exemplified by the fact that 75% of the gross budget was allotted to 
urban poverty were less than 40% of the poor resided. Additionally, there was a striking 
disparity between the sum allotted to generalized and targeted programs. Most of the 
money was absorbed by generalized bread and tortilla subsidies in urban areas11 where 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid 
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the help was arguably less needed. Consequently, these programs were extremely skewed 
to favor the urban poor rather than the needier rural communities.  
The disparity in aid distribution was not necessarily deliberate. A majority of the 
country’s poor resided in remote rural areas. A large number of these communities were 
located in mountainous regions and lacked roads. Additionally, they did not have the 
storage availability and a strong administration to regulate a mass shipment of food 
resources. Furthermore, the rural population was more disperse than the clustered urban 
residents and thus they were significantly costlier to reach. By 1995, over 2.5 million 
individuals lived in 150,000 secluded localities of less than 100 people. Additionally, 7.8 
million people resided in 33,000 zones of between 100 and 500 inhabitants.12 These 
factors combined made it difficult for government led programs to provide these 
communities with aid. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the urban 
poor often excreted more political power and were more assertive in demanding their 
stipends. These difficulties made it so that the rural poor received the least aid by a wide 
margin.  
In terms of health, the government had also failed to provide the rural and urban 
poor with comparable assistance up until the mid-1990s. Despite a series of governmental 
efforts, a large lump of the rural population lacked access to preventive health services 
and had insufficient information about basic health care. Subsequently, this population 
was more vulnerable to early morbidity, malnutrition, and a host of easily preventable 
12 Ibid 
13 
 
                                                          
illnesses. In 1995, the mortality rate for rural poor was roughly 165% higher than that or 
underprivileged urban populations.13  
Finally, as was characteristic of Mexico at the time, there was also a wide 
disparity in educational achievements amongst social strata. By the early nineties, an 
overwhelming majority of the population attended primary school,  in 1994, a staggering 
97.5% of the population was enrolled in primary school and approximately half went on 
to enroll in secondary school.14 However, the educational quality of public schools in 
marginalized areas was significantly lower than that of urban schools. These schools 
were run by untrained teachers who regularly failed to teach students the required 
curriculum. In the most extreme cases, predominantly indigenous populations failed to 
learn vernacular Spanish and thus remained confined to poor regions that spoke the 
pertinent indigenous dialect. 
Tequila Crisis  
 In 1994 President Salinas de Gortari’s administration ratified NAFTA setting the 
country up for a mass inflow of capital from the private sector. However, the treaty’s 
passage was greeted with chaos and disorder undermining the image of national stability 
that the government was trying to convey. Early in 1994, the Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation publically declared war against the Mexican state in response to the passage of 
the trade agreement. The Zapatistas believed that NAFTA would widen the gap between 
the wealthy and poor, especially in rural regions like Chiapas where the revolutionary 
army was based. The movement received widespread media attention both locally and 
13 Ibid  
14 World Bank Group, ed. World development indicators 2012. World Bank Publications, 2012. 
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internationally thus causing investors to place a risk premium on Mexican assets. 
Furthermore, Mexico’s volatility was heightened in late March when beloved presidential 
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio was assassinated while campaigning in Tijuana. This 
resulted in widespread political and social instability as the elections neared.  
 In order to counter the detrimental effects of the newfound unsteadiness, the 
Mexican Central Bank issued dollar denominated public debt in order to buy pesos. 
However, the Banco de Mexico was unable to continue in this trend for long and thus 
newly inaugurated President Ernesto Zedillo was forced to devalue the peso in late 
December. The devaluation appeared to the public as a confirmation that Mexico was in 
financial distress and thus capital flowed out of Mexico at a rapid pace. Investors 
demanded higher risk premiums over their investments and thus the central bank was 
being coerced into increasing interest rates. This placed downward pressure on the peso 
which would eventually lead the Mexican Stock Exchange to plummet a few weeks later. 
The elevated cost of capital hindered the speed of recovery and thus the country faced 
one of the longest recessions in its recent history.  
  The effects of the 1994 Mexican peso crisis took a toll on Mexicans for many 
years to come. The country’s GDP had fallen by 6.2 % in 1995,15 the largest reduction in 
economic activity in five decades. The elevated interest rates posed a huge obstacle to 
growth and recovery. In addition to a stagnant economy, Mexico faced hyperinflation and 
thus a meteoric fall in real wages of 30-35%. Prices went up by 35% in 1995. 
15 Pereznieto, Paola. The Case of Mexico's 1995 Peso Crisis and Argentina's 2002 Convertibility Crisis. No. 1008. 
2010. 
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Subsequently, the rural poor took a big hit. Patrimonial poverty reached a staggering 69% 
while food poverty increased over 15% since the previous year.16  
 In quickly became apparent to the newly appointed Zedillo administration that the 
poor would have to be provided with ample resources in order to navigate the crisis. 
Although many officials lobbied for the strengthening of existing programs, members of 
the Finance Ministry pushed for a new approach in poverty reduction.17 The 
overwhelming economic difficulties coupled with the malleability of a newly established 
administration presented the perfect environment for experimenting with a new approach. 
Therefore, a reluctant cabinet set out to design a program that would deal with the short-
term ramifications of the economic crisis as well as propel recipients towards permanent 
stability. Additionally, the government was tasked with implementing this new approach 
despite having a historically low budget being that the government had cut government 
spending drastically in order to minimize the long-term effects of the economic recession. 
In an attempt to reconcile this myriad of complex goals the government looked to novel 
approaches abroad.  In 1996, the Mexican Government sent a delegation to Brazil to visit 
several municipal “Bolsa Familia” conditional cash transfer programs. This would 
eventually lead to Mexico to tentatively launching a CCT program in 1997.18  
 
 
 
16 Ibid   
17 Levy, Santiago. Progress against poverty: sustaining Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007. 
18 Lindert, Kathy, et al. "The nuts and bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program: implementing conditional cash transfers 
in a decentralized context." (2007). 
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Literature Review  
CCT Model  
The model for conditional cash transfer is simple: encourage families to develop 
the skills necessary to build a healthy patrimony by reinforcing human capital building 
practices through monetary compensation. That is, give families cash stipends if they 
agree to invest in what the government believes to be sustainable behaviors (education, 
health services, and nutrition).  
The model for CCT rests on the assumption that local governments are to blame 
for poverty. Namely, individuals fall into poverty because the government fails to grant 
them adequate resources in their quest for prosperity. Thereafter, it is assumed that these 
individuals would live above the poverty line had society granted them access to 
education, healthcare, etc. This perception is prevalent in a majority of Latin American 
countries. In the case of Mexico, an estimated 65.8 percent of people believe that citizens 
are poor because “society is unjust”. Conversely, only around 24 percent blame poverty 
on the poor. Accordingly, 56.9% of Mexicans admittedly stated that “the poor have very 
little chance to escape from poverty.”19  These beliefs lie in stark contrast with those of 
the United States where a staggering 61.2 percent of interviewees believed the poor to be 
in their respective situations because “they are lazy”. Subsequently, only 29.5 % of 
Americans thought that “the poor have very little chance to escape poverty.”20  
Conditional cash transfer programs sought to provide individuals with the proper 
tools to escape poverty. Many programs faced two major problems: improper targeting 
19 Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias, and Joseph Shapiro. "Redistributing income to the poor and the rich: Public 
transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean." Social Safety Nets Primer Series (2006). 
20 Ibid  
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and recipient dependency. Governments worldwide often faced great difficulty in 
reaching their nation’s poorest and additionally often failed to lift benefited individuals 
out of long-term poverty. Thus CCT programs were designed to both reduce current 
poverty and inequality by providing families with a minimum income as well as break the 
inter-generational transmission of poverty by conditioning these transfers on participant’s 
compliance with a series of human capital objectives. These included school attendance, 
vaccines, and pre-natal visits.21   
The CCT model was initially conceived as an attempt to fulfill society’s perceived 
debt to the poor.22 A government should provide a minimum income to the poor that 
would suffice for them to live above the poverty line. However, in order to prevent 
dependence on these stipends CCT had to go beyond merely addressing the immediate 
needs of the poor. And thus, beneficiaries would only be granted their respective stipend 
if they succeeding in complying with certain human capital building requirements. The 
premise stood that linking the receipt of welfare payments to investment in future 
outcomes would ensure that the money spent today could contribute to long-term poverty 
eradication. CCT essentially made it costly for parents to forego their child’s education 
since they would be giving up stable governmental compensation in doing so.  
Progresa-Oportunidades Approach  
In the case of Mexico the CCT approach addressed many of the criticisms of 
previous welfare strategies the government had experimented with. By aiding 
underprivileged families in developing human capital, CCT would eliminate the problem 
21 Lindert, Kathy, et al. "The nuts and bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program: implementing conditional cash transfers 
in a decentralized context." (2007). 
22 Ibid  
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of long term dependency on handouts. Additionally, this strategy would mean foregoing 
the high costs of delivering food subsidies to the rural poor who often inhabit remote 
municipalities. Having recently faced heavy budget cuts after the 1994 peso crisis, 
Zedillo’ cabinet members endorsed CCT as a perfect fit. Progresa was designed to be 
both sustainable and relatively inexpensive. However, as intuitive CCT might seem the 
theory was in its infancy in the mid-1990s. Thus, the Mexican government faced the 
daunting challenge of designing a program around a novel and untested theory. 
Consequently, the administration shied away from making drastic moves.  
The initial model for Progresa was only implemented in a select few rural states. 
While a substantial number of cabinet members favored CCT others viewed this new-age 
solution with skepticism. Thus, the pilot face was launched in rural Campeche and was 
not given any significant media attention.  In 1996, 31,000 extremely poor rural 
households received CCT grants and were carefully evaluated by the Instituto Nacional 
Autónomo de Mexico.23The study concluded the program to be a success. It also pointed 
to the fact that its implementation rendered the other local welfare agencies futile. Thus, 
it was determined that the program should be run by a single entity that would be given 
considerable legal power.24 
Consequently, Progresa came to be centrally run. Since its early stages and 
throughout, the administrative unit in charge is a federal agency that gathers all the 
relevant data, determines eligibility, issues payments to households, contracts for external 
23 Levy, Santiago. Progress against poverty: sustaining Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007. 
24 United Nations Development Program. “Mexico: Scaling Up Progresa/Oportunidades-Conditional Cash Transfer 
Programme” UNDP, 2011.  
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evaluations, and coordinates with other federal ministries and agencies. Although 
relevant government ministries are responsible for providing beneficiaries with proper 
public education and health services, the actual transferences are handled by the Progresa 
administration.25 
In addition to eliminating surplus government agencies, Progresa was made more 
efficient my means of targeting. The program was expanded to cover 357 municipalities 
within twelve different states.26 In order to elect the communities that would be 
benefitted, the administration constructed a multidimensional index of marginality. Based 
on a series of aggregate local indicators, the neediest regions were selected.27 Program 
leaders subsequently developed another targeting method to distinguish the neediest 
individuals within these communities in order to cover the 300,000 most deprived 
households.  In order to do so, Progresa officials would visit every home within the 
targeted region and conduct a survey to assess how desperate each situation was. The 
census, officially denominated the ENCASEH collected information on a range of socio-
economic characteristics including number of residents, access to medical services, years 
of education. The survey essentially measured household specific poverty using a 
multidimensional approach that combined income with a other relevant factors such as 
dwelling characteristics, dependency ratios, ownership of durable goods, etc. The usage 
of such a comprehensive survey was meant to make a holistic determination of poverty 
whilst making it difficult for families to manipulate their results. Numerical weights were 
25 Levy, Santiago. Progress against poverty: sustaining Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007. 
26 Ibid  
27 Behrman, Jere, and Susan Parker. "The impact of the PROGRESA/Oportunidades conditional cash transfer program 
on health and related outcomes for the aging in Mexico." (2011). 
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assigned to each characteristic to calculate a household score. This result was then 
compared to the “threshold score” that represented the acceptable minimal. If the 
household scored lower than this threshold they were eligible to become enrolled in 
Progresa.28  
Although this method of targeting was successful in the early stages of Progresa, 
it was modified to accommodate differing characteristics of urban regions. In 2002, 
President Vicente Fox expanded the program to include urban dwellings.29 Soon after, it 
became clear that a marginally smaller number of households were eligible as 
beneficiaries under the rural threshold. Furthermore, the large number of applicants made 
it difficult for administrators to evaluate each household separately. Thus, a method of 
self-selection was developed in order to accommodate all households and expedite the 
process. Once participating communities were identified, a large scale media campaign 
was conducted therein to promote the program and its benefits. In order to reach most 
community members, the program was advertised in a plethora of mediums including 
television, radio, posters in churches, loudspeaker announcements, etc.30  Community 
members were encouraged to fill out a survey on a series of individual socio-economic 
factors. Based on their score on this survey they were deemed either eligible or unfit to 
proceed to the next phase. Those that were determined needy enough were evaluated by 
Progresa officials at home who would verify the information provided in the survey. 
These updated results are then processed by the administrative office were induction 
28  Coady, David, and Susan Parker. Targeting social transfers to the poor in mexico. No. 9-60. International Monetary 
Fund, 2009. 
29 Vicente Fox also went on to rename the program Oportunidades in 2002 
30 Levy, Santiago. Progress against poverty: sustaining Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007. 
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decisions were made.31  Although both methods of selection remain in place, the latter 
has become the most widespread due to its heightened efficiency and reduced cost. 
However, administrative selection is arguable better at reaching the rural poor living 
under the lagging rural poor that the program aimed to target in the first place.  
Once beneficiaries have been selected, they are obligated to register family 
members in the local health clinic and the school to which they are assigned. Family 
members agree keep up with their academic and medical obligations in the months to 
follow. Requirements depend on each individual’s age, gender, and educational 
attainment level. Local health and school officials are then mandated to periodically 
record a household’s attendance at schools and clinics and report back to the 
administration every two months. Progresa-Oportunidades households receive $250 
unconditioned pesos ($15 dollars) per adult a month. If they wish to grow this amount, 
households must oblige in consistent school attendance and medical consultations. 32 
In terms of health, Progresa/Oportunidades provides a mix of cash and in-kind 
benefits. All participants receive a monthly health stipend regardless of their 
performance. In addition, pregnant or nursing women who care for infants or 
malnourished children receive a physical nutritional supplement. However, these benefits 
are conditioned on families attending health clinics on a regular basis. If they comply, 
households are poised to receive an added food support transfer of $189 pesos ($11.50). 
31 Coady, David, and Susan Parker. Targeting social transfers to the poor in mexico. No. 9-60. International Monetary 
Fund, 2009. 
32 Levy, Santiago. Progress against poverty: sustaining Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007. 
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Additionally, the nutritional supplement is distributed exclusively at relevant health 
clinics.33  
The more substantive transfer is the scholarship given to children and young 
adults enrolled in grades 3 to 12. The value of the scholarship increases as children 
progress to higher grades. Additionally, grants are greater for girls than boys starting at 
the secondary level. Starting with an amount of $120 pesos ($7.30) for children in 
primary school, it goes up to $760 pesos ($46 dollars) for females in twelfth grade.34  
As a further goal, the Zedillo administration sought consistency. The long-term 
outlook of this program necessitated an extended commitment to this initiative. However, 
history pointed to the fact that very few social programs survived the change in 
governmental administrations. Thereafter, the program had to prove to be manifestly 
successful for it to attain permanence and thus the program was intensely scrutinized by 
government officials. This practice led to the continuation and subsequent expansion of 
CCT in Mexico long after Zedillo left office. Although the succeeding President Vicente 
Fox renamed the program Oportunidades in 2002, the program survived intact.35  
Progresa-Oportunidades Results  
 In the realm of welfare initiatives, Progresa was pioneering. The programs 
imposition of explicit conditions coupled with new targeting methods were 
unprecedented. Thereafter, little evidence existed to corroborate the plausibility of 
conditional cash transfer. As a result, the Mexican government monitored the program 
33 Ibid  
34 Soares, Sergei, et al. "Conditional cash transfers in Brazil, Chile and Mexico: impacts upon inequality." Estudios 
económicos 1 (2009): 207-224. 
35 Levy, Santiago. Progress against poverty: sustaining Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007. 
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closely and collected a wide array of data in order to shed light on the efficiency of the 
program. Consequently, a multitude of scholars and government officials ventured to 
analyze the relative success of Progresa. Most relevant parties consider the program an 
utter success in the short run.   
Table #1: Food Consumption in Rural Progresa Households 
Metric  Consumption Calorie 
Intake 
Fruits  
Consumption 
Vegetable 
Consumption 
Household 
Increase 
(%)  
15% 7.1% 16% 30% 
 
In granting families cash transfers, Progresa administrators sought to increase a 
household’s disposable income in the hopes that a portion of the transfers would be 
invested in food consumption. As shown in Table #1, in the case of rural families, overall 
consumption increased by 15 percent on average. It is estimated that over three quarters 
of this increase went to food.36 Additionally, the increase in food consumption was 
present early on. A mere two years after the programs launch, households receiving 
Progresa benefits consumed 7.1% more calories than did comparable families in control 
non-benefited localities. In addition, the programs emphasis on healthy eating also had a 
positive impact on food choice. Participation in Progresa appeared to have an impact on 
the acquisition of calories from fruits, vegetables, and animal products. This pointed to 
the fact that families were intentionally forgoing unhealthy bread based products such as 
tortillas.37  It is estimated that families consumed 16% more fruits and vegetables and 
36 Hoddinott, John, Emmanuel Skoufias, and Ryan Washburn. "The impact of PROGRESA on consumption: A final 
report." International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC (2000). 
37 Hoddinott, John, and Emmanuel Skoufias. "The impact of PROGRESA on food consumption." Economic 
development and cultural change 53.1 (2004): 37-61. 
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30% more animal products (especially poultry) after the implementation of the program. 
Consequently, the program was successful in increasing both food intakes as well as 
promoting a healthier diet through its health seminars.38  
 Furthermore, there is overwhelming evidence to show the fact that Progresa and 
Oportunidades were successful in boosting the use of preventive health services by 
participants. Preventive care visits grew fivefold during the programs first five years. In 
turn, nutrition related visits increased by 45%.39  This drastic increase was especially 
visible in rural areas, where resident’s health was particularly dire.  In rural areas alone, 
demand for such services rose from 30% to 50% within the programs first two years.40 
Results were particularly substantial for households with young children. Participant 
consults to monitor nutritional status increased by 30% in infants up to two years age and 
by 25% for children from three to five.41 This shift towards illness prevention led to 
decreased incidences of emergency hospitalization. For the same set of rural households, 
there was a 58% drop in hospital visits in both infants and the over-fifty age group.42  
Consequently, the morbidity rate for children born to Progresa households was 
around 25% lower in the first six months of life than in comparable non-benefited rural 
families. Additionally, the program saw a 39% reduction in illness in children aged zero 
to three a mere two years after the programs implementation.43 The improvement in 
38 Ibid  
39 Fernald, Lia CH, Paul J. Gertler, and Lynnette M. Neufeld. "Role of cash in conditional cash transfer programmes for 
child health, growth, and development: an analysis of Mexico's Oportunidades." The Lancet 371.9615 (2008): 828-837. 
40 Ibid  
41 Huerta, María del Carmen, and Daniel Hernández. "Algunos aspectos de salud reproductiva de la población 
beneficiaria de Progresa." Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (2000). 
42 Fernald, Lia CH, Paul J. Gertler, and Lynnette M. Neufeld. "Role of cash in conditional cash transfer programmes for 
child health, growth, and development: an analysis of Mexico's Oportunidades." The Lancet 371.9615 (2008): 828-837. 
43 Levy, Santiago. Progress against poverty: sustaining Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007. 
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health was particularly evident in pregnant mothers. Maternal mortality dropped by 11% 
while infant mortality went down by 2% as well. At the same time, the program was 
successful in increasing the use of safe contraceptive methods in rural households. The 
greatest increase occurred in young women aged twenty to twenty-four.44  
The Progresa-Oportunidades program also sought to increase the attainment of 
education in disadvantaged communities. By conditioning monetary support on the 
incidence of school attendance, administrators strived to aid young beneficiaries in 
becoming more marketable than their parents and hopefully escaping poverty 
permanently. Fortunately, the program was successful in both increasing school 
enrollment and reducing dropout rates for those students. Although primary school 
enrollment was remarkably high before 1997 the program had positive effects on failure 
and dropout rates.45 The increase is successful school enrollment was particularly strong 
in the case of families with parents who had only completed a mere three years of 
schooling. Pointing to the possibility that the educational increase was the most poignant 
when there were greater lags.46  
Table #2: School Advancement and Job Participation in Beneficiaries and Non-
Beneficiaries 
Metric Regular School 
Advancement 
(boys) 
Regular School 
Advancement 
(girls) 
Premature Job 
Market 
Participation 
Progresa 
Beneficiaries 
64% 39% 10% 
Non-
Beneficiaries 
38% 30% 45% 
44 Huerta, María del Carmen, and Daniel Hernández. "Algunos aspectos de salud reproductiva de la población 
beneficiaria de Progresa." Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (2000). 
45 Levy, Santiago. Progress against poverty: sustaining Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007. 
46 Ibid  
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Furthermore, researchers found that Progresa-Oportunidades children were not 
only more frequently enrolled in school but that they outperformed relevant 
counterparties on average. In rural areas, children who had been incorporated into the 
program for at least five years advanced more rapidly thorough school.47 As shown in 
Table #2, the proportion of boys that advanced through school regularly was 64% for 
those in the program compared to 38% for those who were not. Similarly, 39% of 
beneficiary girls were more successful in completing at least five years of school in a six 
year period compared to 30% for other relevant parties. Consequently, the program saw a 
decrease in the participation of young boys and girls in the informal labor market. Studies 
found that boys who were 10 to 14 years of age were up to 35% less likely to partake in 
the labor market.48 
Table #3: Change in Poverty Headcount in Rural and Urban Beneficiaries  
Metric Change in 
Poverty 
Headcount 
Change in 
Moderate 
Poverty 
Change in 
Extreme 
Poverty 
Rural 
Beneficiaries 
-9.7 -18.7 -28.7 
Urban 
Beneficiaries  
-2.6 -4.9 -1.7 
 
In terms of income, Progresa was particularly successful in lifting the extremely 
poor out of severe poverty. As portrayed in Table #3, the headcount poverty gap, and 
severity indexes fell by 9.7, 18.7, and 28.7 percent respectively in 2004 (seven years after 
the programs implementation). This drop was more moderate in urban areas where these 
47 Behrman, Jere R., Susan W. Parker, and Petra E. Todd. Long-term impacts of the Oportunidades conditional cash 
transfer program on rural youth in Mexico. No. 122. Discussion papers//Ibero America Institute for Economic 
Research, 2005. 
48 Ibid  
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indices fell by 2.6, 4.9, and 1.7 percent respectively.49 Thus, the program had the biggest 
impact on the extremely poor in rural regions. This is unsurprising as Progresa was 
initially designed to aid the nation’s poorest in the countries more remote regions. These 
results also point to the fact that the program had the most overwhelmingly positive 
results in the poorest households being that they had the most room for economic growth.  
 In terms of the medium run, benefited families experienced better health. Children 
in rural communities became more resistant to disease as a result of better caloric intake 
and consistent preventive medical consultations. The incidence of disease decreased by 
12% in children up to two years old and 11% for children aged 3 to 6.50 Furthermore, 
children in benefited households tended to be taller than comparable counterparts. 
Researchers found that benefited children grew 1 cm more every year than relevant non-
beneficiaries. On the basis of these indicators, it became clear than severe malnutrition 
had dropped on average in these households.51 Malnourishment among rural children 
dropped by 17% in the case of infants aged zero to three.52 Proper nutrition is widely 
perceived to have a substantial persistent impact on a child’s physical and mental 
development and on their health status as adults. It follows, that healthy adults are better 
able to retain and preform in a wider range of jobs. Thus, these results hint to Progresa 
49 Cortes, Fernando, Patricio Solís, and Israel Banegas. "Oportunidades y pobreza en México: 2002-2004." El Colegio 
de México, Mexico (2006). 
50 Fernald, Lia CH, Paul J. Gertler, and Lynnette M. Neufeld. "Role of cash in conditional cash transfer programmes for 
child health, growth, and development: an analysis of Mexico's Oportunidades." The Lancet 371.9615 (2008): 828-837. 
51 Ibid  
52 Ibid   
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having fairly substantial effects on lifetime productivities and earning in children brought 
up in benefited households.53  
 Progresa sought to have an impact on household’s long-term living standards. 
Program developers hoped that beneficiaries would allot a portion of their disposable 
income on interest yielding investments. Researchers found that a large number of 
beneficiaries did in fact devote a portion of their resources in productive activities. For 
each peso families received, they invested around 14 cents. This investment improved 
family’s income producing capabilities as they had estimated rates of return of 15.34%. 
Thereafter, after nine years in the program beneficiary households were able to increase 
consumption by 47.6% evidencing the apparent sustainability of cash transfers.54 
Additionally, program participants were 33% likelier to participate in microenterprise 
being that the cash transfers often eliminated their liquidity shortages.55 Strikingly, it also 
became apparent that women were more prone to take part in these industries. However, 
evidence also pointed to the fact that these potentially sustainable investments were more 
prevalent in urban rather than rural communities.56  
Expansion of CCT in Latin America and Some Examples 
 Mexico and Brazil were the first Latin American countries to experiment with 
government sponsored conditional cash transfer. However, by the mid-2000s these 
programs had come to dominate the social protection sector in Latin America and the 
53 Behrman, Jere, and John Hoddinott. An Evaluation of the Impact of Progresa on Preschool Child Height. 
International Food Policy Research Institute. Food Consumption and Nutrition Division. No. 104. Discussion Paper, 
2001. 
54 Gertler, Paul, Sebastian Martinez, and Marta Rubio-Codina. "Investing cash transfers to raise long term living 
standards." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3994 (2007). 
55 Ibid  
56 Ibid  
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Caribbean. By 2006 virtually all Latin American countries had implemented some form 
of conditional cash transfer.  
The reason for the rapid expansion and popularity of these programs is twofold. 
Firstly, the apparent success of both Progresa-Oportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa 
Familia in Brazil promised similar results in other Latin American Countries (LAC). 
Much like pre-CCT Mexico, social protection in Latin America predominantly focused 
on work related social insurance which included health coverage and pensions.57 
Although these programs were somewhat successful in helping low-income workers 
become less vulnerable to economic shocks, they also failed to reach significant portions 
of their respective nations poor. The fact that the rural poor lived in remote communities 
coupled with the high prevalence of informal employment led to a large number of 
people being excluded from government initiatives. Secondly, faced with the evident 
success of CCT initiatives, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World 
Bank became increasingly willing to sponsor human-capital investment loans. 
Consequently, a large array of countries ceased the possibility of implementing a visibly 
fruitful and partially sponsored project. 58 
Brazil’s Bolsa Escola and Mexico’s Progresa were quickly followed by 
Honduras’ Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF) in 1998. By the late 1970s, 
Honduras had failed to develop a strong central government. For much of the 20th 
century, Honduras’ economy had been heavily reliant of U.S. investment, especially in 
57 Stampini, Marco, and Leopoldo Tornarolli. The growth of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: did they go too far?. No. 49. IZA Policy Paper, 2012. 
58 Adato, Michelle, and John Hoddinott. "Conditional cash transfer programs: A" magic bullet" for reducing poverty?." 
(2007): 139-154. 
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the ample banana sector. Consequently, the United States had supplied the military 
government in place at the time in order to keep Honduras free of communism. However, 
social protection and living conditions for the poor were deplorable. USAID extended 
help to Honduras throughout the 80s and 90s; however these programs were highly 
criticized for their cost inefficiency, poor targeting, and reliance on foreign food supply. 
Conditions worsened when the U.S. found a more strategic ally in Nicaragua and lost 
interest in Honduras as a strategic partner. A large portion of U.S. resources were 
withdrawn and the country’s poor were left in a desperate situation.59 Half of Honduran 
households were impoverished with 30% living in extreme poverty.60  
In the early 1990s, the World Bank partnered with the IDB to sponsor Honduras’ 
conditional cash transfer program: PRAF. Consequently, both organizations held 
significant discretion in determining the aim and administration of the program. PRAF 
originally sought to target families that fell below critically low levels of consumption 
and provide them with increased levels of nutrition, education, and health. In order to do 
so, PRAF granted women vouchers for food stamps when they fulfilled co-
responsibilities in health and education. Some program components were conditioned 
while others were not. However, the co-responsibilities were both few and seldom 
enforced. Consequently, the program initially functioned as an unconditioned cash 
transfer program. This first program was largely unsuccessful despite heavy budgetary 
59 Moore, Charity. "The political economy of social protection in Honduras and Nicaragua." Conditional cash transfers 
in Latin America (2010): 101-126. 
60 Ibid   
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increases through the 1990s. Thereafter, the program was transitioned into a conditional 
cash transfer initiative in 1998.61  
This second phase of the program was significantly more successful. Researchers 
estimate that the program was successful in increasing school enrollment rates by 1-2% 
yearly. Additionally, dropout rate was reduced by 2-3 percentage points.62 In terms of 
nutrition, benefited families steadily increased calorie consumption year to year.63 
Additionally, the effect of this program was the most visible in the poorest households. 
However, project managers continue to struggle with the implementation of CCT policies 
consequently yielding less than ideal results. The lack of coordination amongst national 
and international fund providers combined with a feeble central government made the 
program much less efficient than Mexico’s Progresa.64 Nevertheless, the program 
remains in place to date.   
Subsequently, the first half of the 2000s saw the introduction of a second wave of 
CCT programs throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Costa Rica added 
Superemonos in 2000, discontinued it in 2002 and finally replaced the original program 
with Avancemos in 2006. Additionally, Nicaragua incorporated CCT into its social 
welfare scheme from 2000 to 2006. Furthermore, Colombia and Chile instated Familias 
en Acción and Chile Solidario respectively in 2001. Jamaica added the Program of 
61 Ibid   
62 Glewwe, Paul, and Pedro Olinto. "Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Schooling: An 
Experimental Analysis of Honduras’ PRAF Program." Unpublished manuscript, University of Minnesota (2004). 
63 Ibid   
64 Ibid   
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Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) in 2002. And finally, Ecuador 
introduced the Bono de Desarollo Humano initiative in 2003.65  
 Despite its geographic proximity with Honduras, Nicaragua had a distinctly 
dissimilar experience with CCT. Nicaragua’s modern history has been strongly shaped by 
its Sandinista National Liberation Front. Nicaragua’s political unrest throughout the 70s 
culminated in the resignation of President Somoza and the seizure of government by the 
socialist Sandinistas in 1979. These insurgents sought to empower Nicaragua’s poor who, 
as it stood, lived in deplorable conditions. Consequently, the new government, set out to 
redistribute wealth and privatize industry, bringing the economy to a halt. This era was 
characterized by a civil war, a declining GDP and exorbitant inflation rates. Although 
these redistributive policies were successful in increasing school enrollment rates and 
extending healthcare to some of the nation’s poor by 1990 Nicaragua’s GDP was as low 
as it had been in the 1920s.66 Consequently, the Sandinistas were voted out of office that 
same year.  
 By 1993, 50% of the Nicaraguans were poor, with 19% living in extreme 
poverty.67 Nicaragua set out to create a viable and sustainable means of social assistance 
that would drive the country into the twenty-first century. The government partnered with 
the World Bank and looked to CCT as a potential way out. Largely modeled after 
65 Stampini, Marco, and Leopoldo Tornarolli. The growth of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: did they go too far?. No. 49. IZA Policy Paper, 2012. 
66 Moore, Charity. "The political economy of social protection in Honduras and Nicaragua." Conditional cash transfers 
in Latin America (2010): 101-126. 
67 Ibid  
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Mexico’s Progresa, Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social (RPS) was funded through an 
IDB loan in early 2000.68  
 RPS, like many other CCT initiatives sought to build human capital. The program 
was designed and administrated by a highly trained staff of scholars experienced in 
conditional cash transfer. RDS expertly targeted the poorest regions and implemented 
rigorous methods of data collection to track the programs development during its early 
stages. Subsequently, the program was spectacularly successful and became 
internationally renowned for its positive effects on malnourishment.69 The program was 
thus renewed for a second phase due to its early success. However, the program was 
absorbed by the larger welfare organ FISE and suffered drastic budget cuts. Many of the 
programs functions were consolidated within similar programs financed by international 
institutions. Consequently, RDS administrators lost much of the independence they had 
garnered during the early stages. This led to a lack of fraternity between RPS and other 
government employees which hindered the programs initial productivity. Despite its 
evident potential this CCT initiative was discontinued in 2006 after failing to reach its 
goals from year to year. This decision was not met with opposition being that the 
Nicaraguan populace had remained skeptical as to the viability of CCT as a means in 
ending poverty.70  
The third wave of CCT Programs came in 2005 and 2006. It included Solidaridad 
in the Dominican Republic, Familias Por la Inclusión Social in Argentina, Comunidades 
68 Moore, Charity. "The political economy of social protection in Honduras and Nicaragua." Conditional cash transfers 
in Latin America (2010): 101-126. 
69 Ibid   
70 Ibid  
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Solidarias Rurales in El Salvador, Red de Oportunidades in Panama, Juntos in Peru and, 
Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social in Uruguay, among others.71  
Amongst these countries, Argentina’s CCT experience differed from those 
mentioned previously. Argentina’s recent economic history has been defined by a series 
of harsh and prolonged economic recessions. Following three decades of prosperity, 
Argentina faced a lengthy period of stagnation from 1975-1990. Although the 
manufacturing industry had grown unobstructed through the 70s, this progress was 
followed by a decade of continuous decline. And thus, Argentina went from housing 
some of the wealthiest per capita citizens in Latin America to having per capita incomes 
below many Latin American counties.72 Conditions only worsened as Argentina entered a 
four year depression in 1998. In previous years, Argentina had relied on private 
investment from both foreign and national markets in order to foster growth. However, 
the Mexican peso crisis of 1996 coupled with the Asian and Russian currency crisis of 
1997 and 1998, discouraged foreign investment in developing economies.73 Menem’s 
government imposed heftier taxation in order to reduce debt margins and stabilize the 
economy. This move proved to be detrimental as it slowed down an already crippled 
market.  The Argentinian people revolted in a multitude of large cities leading to a series 
of political shifts, further chaos, and the end of the Argentinian peso to the dollar.74  
As a result of the crisis, the country experienced a sudden increase in poverty and 
unemployment. The government reacted by creating a series of CCT programs to better 
71  Stampini, Marco, and Leopoldo Tornarolli. The growth of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: did they go too far?. No. 49. IZA Policy Paper, 2012. 
72 Kehoe, Timothy J. "What can we learn from the 1998-2002 depression in Argentina?." Great depressions of the 
twentieth century (2007). 
73 Ibid   
74 Ibid   
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equip the poor to deal with economic shocks in the short and medium run. This initiative 
housed three different CCT programs to target different problems: the Unemployed 
Heads of Household Plan, the Families Plan for Social Inclusion, and the Training and 
Employment Insurance. However, they were consolidated under the Universal Child 
Allowance (UCA) in 2009. This program became the largest social protection initiative in 
Argentina, granting aid to over 2 million underprivileged households.75 In the case of this 
program, monthly payments are granted to either male or female heads of household for 
each child under eighteen who resides in the family unit. The cash transfers were 
staggered, (granted in smaller quantities at different point of the month) and were 
conditioned on human capital building activities similar to those of Progresa.76  
UCA has been evidenced to be success. Research suggests that the program had a 
positive impact on primary and secondary school enrollment and attendance. The share of 
beneficiary heads with at least some secondary education grew from 32% to 46% from 
2005-2010.77 There was also an observed reduction in dropout rates.78 Furthermore, the 
program saw a substantial increase in the percentage of household heads engaged in 
formal wage employment.79  
Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Argentina differ in their implementation of 
conditional cash transfer. However, they share a series of similarities that shed some light 
75 Stampini, Marco, and Leopoldo Tornarolli. The growth of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: did they go too far?. No. 49. IZA Policy Paper, 2012. 
76 Rabinovich, Lila, and Stephanie Diepeveen. "The Design of Conditional Cash Transfers: Experiences from 
Argentina's Universal Child Allowance." CESR-Schaeffer Working Paper 2014-006 (2014). 
77 Stampini, Marco, and Leopoldo Tornarolli. The growth of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: did they go too far?. No. 49. IZA Policy Paper, 2012. 
78 Conditional cash transfer in argentin Rabinovich, Lila, and Stephanie Diepeveen. "The Design of Conditional Cash 
Transfers: Experiences from Argentina's Universal Child Allowance." CESR-Schaeffer Working Paper 2014-006 
(2014).a? 
79Stampini, Marco, and Leopoldo Tornarolli. The growth of conditional cash transfers in Latin America and the 
Caribbean: did they go too far?. No. 49. IZA Policy Paper, 2012. 
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on the CCT experience in Latin America. Time and time again, CCT programs were 
shown to be instantly successful in improving the living standards of each nation’s 
poorest. The programs relative victories and shortcomings were more carefully 
scrutinized than previous welfare efforts and thus administrators were better able to 
present the general public tangible results. And thus, many concluded CCT to be a simple 
and efficient panacea to poverty and inequality. Thereafter, many countries in the region 
implemented similar strategies in order to address age old problems in particularly 
desperate times. Consequently, it is particularly important to analyze the long-term 
effects of CCT initiatives being that they have become widely implemented across Latin 
America.  
CCT Criticism 
 Conditional cash transfer programs have been evidenced to be efficient methods 
in poverty reduction if properly administrated. However, they might not be the panacea 
that they promise to be. Although ample evidence exists to corroborate the efficiency of 
CCT programs in the short term it is not clear that these initiatives are a tangible cure for 
poverty in the long-run. That is, programs such as Oportunidades might not be achieving 
the growth in human capital that differentiated the programs from conventional welfare. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to make an accurate determination either way.  
 Ingrained in CCT philosophy is the aim to break intergenerational poverty cycles 
by building human capital. However, program administrators rely on governmental 
budgeting and are thus inclined to focus on demonstrable short term goals. Generating 
these results is straightforward. Beneficiaries will most likely be better off after enrolling 
in the program because individual households painlessly increase their income and 
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consumption from month to month. However, linking changes in the national incidence 
of poverty with expenditures on CCT programs is difficult. The children of CCT 
beneficiaries will likely be better educated and healthier than their parents. Nevertheless, 
their ability to break free from poverty is influenced by a myriad of both economic and 
social factors outside of the CCT realm. A lack of formal employment opportunities or an 
economic recession can dramatically hinder the efforts of such programs.  
 In terms of developing human capital, CCT programs focus exclusively on the 
younger school age generation. Within households, only minors are compensated for 
attending school and building towards their future. This leaves those that are of age 
incentivized to follow suit. Although this methodology is the most plausible it prevents 
household parents from sustainably increasing their income generating capabilities. 
Thereafter, these households may not be able to keep up with their expenses after the 
cash transfers are withdrawn once the children have left home. Furthermore, when the 
benefited generation does leave they might not be greeted with lucrative job 
opportunities. CCT programs often target remote rural communities and thus it would be 
difficult for individuals to find profitable jobs within their respective communities. 
However, there is no guarantee that they will encounter opportunities in the formal labor 
market elsewhere. It has then been suggested that CCT programs should place a portion 
of their resources in developing infrastructure and industry within the benefited 
communities in order to facilitate this critical transition. However, this would prove 
significantly costly and the results of this operation would not be evidenced as cost 
efficient in the short-run.  
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Thesis Aim   
This thesis aims to determine whether or not the largest CCT initiatives were 
more successful than others in reducing poverty rates, increasing secondary school 
enrollment, and reducing population inequality over a thirteen year period. Namely, were 
countries that invested in covering a larger portion of the population more productive 
than those who housed comparably smaller scale conditional cash transfer initiatives?  
Data Description  
 The data set includes figures for eighteen different Latin American and Caribbean 
countries from 1997 to 2010. These countries were selected on the basis that they all had 
a CCT program in place for at least three years during this time span. In order to assess 
the magnitude of each country’s conditional cash transfer initiative the data includes the 
percentage of the total population covered by the program each year. Furthermore, the 
data set contains the Gini coefficient, secondary school enrollment rates, and poverty 
rates for each of these countries year to year. These figures are meant to reflect the 
change in national poverty, schooling, and inequality from the beginning to end of the 
period.  
Number of Beneficiaries/Population  
 This measure was formulated in order to better grasp the relative size of CCT 
programs within each of the eighteen countries. While it is clear that some countries 
invested a large portion of their social development budget on CCT others merely 
experimented with small pilot programs. As is intuitive, larger countries tended to benefit 
more people. However, this was not necessarily reflective of each government’s 
commitment to CCT as population size varies greatly within Latin America. In order to 
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deal with this bias, the metric labeled “BP” consists of the total number of program 
beneficiaries divided by the corresponding year’s total population in order to derive the 
portion of the population that was benefited by the program year to year.  This measure 
eliminates population size bias and is more accurate in describing program size.  
The number of beneficiaries was derived from administrative and household 
survey data for each country. The Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (SEDLAC) partnered with World Bank80 in order to analyze each country’s 
database. The number of beneficiaries was in turn derived from 300 of these surveys in 
18 different LAC. It is important to note that household surveys were illustrative in 
deriving the number of program beneficiaries in recent years since they included a 
module to report participation or non-participation. However, it was necessary to rely on 
each individual’s government data for the earlier years before the module was introduced. 
Furthermore, household surveys are not representative of the entire population and thus 
estimation is necessary. This means that the total number of beneficiaries will not match 
the numbers presented in the study. However, it is possible to make an educated guess 
since CCT programs mainly target the extremely poor in rural areas.  
The values for the total population year to year were collected from the World 
Bank. This figure represents the sum total of all residents of a country regardless of legal 
status or citizenship (with the exception of refugees). Subsequently, Table #4 represents 
the percent total of beneficiaries in each country from year to year. The (-) denotes CCT 
programs not being instated in that particular year.  
 
80 SEDLAC and World Bank Group, ed. Poverty Rates in Latin America. SEDLAC, 2012. 
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Table #4: Percent Population Coverage by National CCT Initiatives  
Country  1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Argentina   - - - - 3% 6% 28% 
Brazil  9% 10% 12% 21% 24% 24% 26% 
Chile  - - - 3% 5% 6% 8% 
Guatemala  - - - - - - 8% 
Honduras  - 10% 10% 6% 11% 11% 11% 
Mexico   2% 11% 15% 20% 22% 22% 23% 
Nicaragua  - - 1% 3%   3% - - 
Panama  - - - - 1% 8% 12% 
Paraguay  - - - - - 1% 8% 
Peru  - - - - 1% 7% 8% 
Uruguay  - - - - 9% 10% 22% 
 
The results shown in Table #4 are illustrative of CCT in Latin America. Although 
a large majority of countries have implemented some form of conditional cash transfer 
programs vary tremendously in age and breadth. While pioneers like Mexico and Brazil 
have hosted CCT programs for 18 years,81 latecomers such as Guatemala have only 
experimented with this approach for a little over five years. Furthermore, most countries 
have expanded their program consistently from year to year. While Mexico’s 
Oportunidades only tended to 2% of the population in 1997, it came to enroll over 22% 
of all residents by the end of 2010. Similarly, Brazil’s Bolsa Escola only benefited 9% of 
the Brazilian population at its dawn but ended up registering 26% of the population in 
2010. However, a small group of countries have either reduced or eliminated CCT 
programs within this same timeframe. For example, Nicaragua experimented with a 
relatively small CCT initiative starting in 2001, however after a mere six years, the 
country did away with the program entirely. Thereafter, it is evident that some countries 
81 Including the years (2011-2015)   
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relied more heavily on CCT in their respective development schemes. While 57% of 
Bolivia’s population participated in the Bono Juancito Pinto program in 2010, Costa 
Rica’s Avancemos only reached 4% of the population. If CCT programs are efficient, one 
could expect countries with larger programs to achieve the largest falls in poverty and 
inequality as well as a steady rise in secondary school enrollment.  
Gini Coefficient  
 The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of national inequality. 
This index is meant to represent the fairness of the income distribution amongst a 
nation’s residents. A Gini coefficient of zero represents perfect equality as it implies 
every person has the exact same income. Conversely, a Gini of 1 represents a perfectly 
unequal society wherein a single individual would possess the entirety of the nation’s 
income. A particular country’s Gini falls between 0 and 1 depending on how equal the 
society is in terms of income. In order to make this determination, a curve is derived 
where the cumulative percentages of total income received are plotted against the 
cumulative number of recipients. The Gini index measures the area between this line and 
a hypothetical line of perfect equality.  
 The dataset includes Gini coefficients for the eighteen countries from year to year 
retrieved from the World Bank.82 Although a good measure of inequality, these figures 
were somewhat problematic. While a large number of countries have Gini coefficients 
available for most years, others only had three or four data point available within the 13 
year span. However, these gaps in data were mostly offset by the fact that this thesis 
focuses on the total change in inequality from the first to the last year of the study. Thus, 
82 World Bank Group, ed. World development indicators 2012. World Bank Publications, 2012. 
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a data point early on and an observation within the last few years sufficed. A plot of some 
of Latin America’s Gini over time is represented in Figure #1. 
Figure #1:  Latin American Gini Coefficients 1997-2010 
 
 Figure #1 shows that inequality levels vary amongst Latin American countries 
throughout the late 90s and early 2000s. In 1997, Brazil and Honduras suffered from 
staggering levels of inequality as high as .60 and .59 respectively. However, Uruguay 
exhibits consistently lower indices as low as .42. These disparities can be partly attributed 
to the differences in a countries share of rural population. This diagram also illustrates the 
relatively high volatility of Gini coefficients in the region. Many countries were affected 
with economic recessions and governmental conflict during the late 1990s. This is the 
case of Argentina wherein the political and economic instability of the early 2000s led to 
a drastic spike in inequality. From 2000 to 2001 a large portion of the nation became 
unemployed whilst facing significant increase in real prices leading to this temporary rise 
in inequality. Regardless of the individual landscape of each country it is also evident that 
a majority of Latin American Gini’s exhibit a downward trend from the beginning to the 
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end of the measured period. Mexico’s inequality coefficient went down from 51.9 in 
1997 to 48.1 by 2010, a 3.8 drop. Similarly, Panama had a remarkably high Gini of 58.2 
in 1997 but managed to reduce this coefficient to 51.9 by the end of the period. In fact, 
albeit a few examples such as Costa Rica most Latin American countries have seen a 
decline in inequality in the early 21st century.   
Secondary School Enrollment  
 Moreover, the dataset includes two different measures of secondary school 
enrollment.  Firstly, the gross enrolment ratio considers total enrollment in secondary 
education, regardless of age as a percentage of the population of official secondary 
education age. This ratio can exceed 100% due to the fact that it includes students who 
are either over or under aged because of their early or late entrance into secondary school. 
Similarly, net secondary school enrolment is the ratio of children of official school age 
who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. 
That is, only children who have managed to stay on track are considered in this metric. 
This statistic can only reach 100%. Subsequently, the percent number of school attendees 
tends to be larger when considering the gross amount of enrollees due to the fact that a 
larger number of people can be considered. However, the net rate is illustrative in 
revealing how well populations are doing in avoiding dropouts and failing.  
 Both enrollment measures were retrieved from the World Bank dataset for each of 
the eighteenth countries from 1997 to 201083. Although net school enrollment is an 
arguably better measure in successful youth schooling more data points tended to be 
available for gross enrollment. Thereafter, both were included. However, the effect of the 
83 World Bank Group, ed. World development indicators 2012. World Bank Publications, 2012. 
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missing values was largely offset by the fact that this project only necessitated a final and 
initial value within the timeframe in order to distinguish at large variation.  
As represented in Figure #2, there is ample variation amongst Latin American 
countries when it comes to school enrollment. Nations like Uruguay have consistently 
enrolled a very large number of people in secondary school. In this case, enrollment rates 
were as high as 89% in 1997. Contrastingly, some countries lagged behind significantly 
in terms of education at the turn of the century. Paraguay and Mexico had significantly 
lower enrollment ratios of 46% and 63% respectively. Thereafter, the subsequent ten 
years saw a drastic increase in these ratios for both countries. Mexico managed to reach 
an 84% enrollment rate in 2010, a 21 percent increase. Similarly, Paraguay saw a 20% 
increase within this timeframe. Contrastingly, Uruguay only saw a percent increase at the 
end of the period. This is indicative that the countries with the most significant lags 
exhibited the greatest change. However, despite individual nuances, secondary school 
enrollment is in expansion overall as portrayed in Figure #2.  
Figure #2: Latin American Gross Secondary School Enrollment Rates 1997-2010 
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Extreme and Moderate Poverty  
 In order to determine changes in the percent population living in poverty for every 
country from year to year, the dataset includes two different indexes: extreme poverty 
and moderate poverty. The former describes the percent of the population who lack the 
sufficient income to satisfy their most basic needs such as water, food, and basic housing.  
The latter represents the percent of the populations who is considered poor but are in less 
danger than the extreme poor. That is, people who accumulate enough income to afford 
their most basic needs but have no disposable income beyond that. In most instances, this 
statistic is calculated by establishing two different international poverty lines for extreme 
and moderate poverty. If an individual subsists with under $1.25 dollars a day he is 
extremely poor. Similarly, if a person’s income is between $1.25 to $2 dollars a day they 
are moderately poor. However, this measure is somewhat problematic being that real 
prices differ dramatically amongst countries.  
Instead, the relevant data for all eighteen countries was retrieved from 
SEDLAC84. Unlike most nations, Latin American countries have generated their own 
extreme poverty lines based on the local cost of a basic food bundle. If an individual is 
unable to afford this basket with their allotted income, they are extremely poor. Similarly, 
if individuals are able to afford the current real price of the food bundle with no 
disposable income to spare they are moderately poor. This data proved problematic in 
that some country’s failed to record poverty statistics rigorously from year to year. 
Thereafter, there are several missing data points. Nevertheless, this is offset by the fact 
84 SEDLAC and World Bank Group, ed. Poverty Rates in Latin America. SEDLAC, 2012. 
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that the main regression only considered an initial and final value in order to grasp the net 
change from 1997 to 2010 thus making this setback unproblematic.  
As illustrated in Figure #3, extreme poverty was in decline during the early 2000s. 
Although individual nations went through brief peaks and troughs within the timeframe 
in question, extreme poverty rates were generally lower in 2010 than 1997. In the case of 
Argentina, a severe economic depression led to a drastic 17% increase in extreme poverty 
between 2000 and 2002. However, 8 years later Argentina’s extreme poor had been 
reduced to 3.1%. This value was 3.3% lower than the initial 6.4% figure in 1997. 
Furthermore, the total change in poverty from beginning to end is more drastic in the case 
of the country’s that were worst off in 1997. For example, as an aftermath of the tequila 
crisis of 1994, Mexico saw a staggering 37% of Mexicans living under extreme poverty 
in 1997. However, by the end of 2010, this figure had gone down to 19%, a dramatic 
eighteen point decrease.  
Figure #3: Extreme Poverty Rates in Latin America 1997-2010 
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 Similarly, as exhibited in Figure #4, moderate poverty rates exhibit a downward 
trend in most Latin American countries. However, the decrease was more drastic for 
some countries than others. In 1997, 36% of the Paraguayan population lived under the 
poverty threshold. Thirteen years later this figure was relatively similar at 32%. 
Contrastingly, Mexico suffered a drastic decrease in moderate poverty during this same 
timeframe. While an astounding 69% of Mexicans lived in poverty in 1997, this figure 
was 18% lower in 2010 at 51%. However, this sharp decrease was not uniform. Mexico 
saw the lowest poverty rate in 2006 at 42.9% at the end of Vicente Fox’s presidency. 
However, this figure had escalated by an ample 7% four years later as the country faced 
the U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2008.85 
Figure #4: Moderate Poverty Rates in Latin America 1997-2010 
  
Furthermore, as depicted in Figure #4 Paraguay’s percent population living in 
poverty increased by over 13% within the first five years of the relevant time span, 
85 Levy, Santiago. Progress against poverty: sustaining Mexico's Progresa-Oportunidades program. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2007. 
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beginning at 36% in 1997 and reaching 49.7% by the end of 2001.This can be partly 
attributed to the assassination of Vice President Luis Maria Agana in early 1999 and the 
political crisis that ensued that led the then President Raul Cubas to resign later that year. 
However, by the end of 2010, the nation saw the lowest moderate poverty rate of the 
decade at 32.4%, a drop of over 12% from five years earlier. This situation is not 
particular to Uruguay, many LAC suffered from at least one economic or political crises 
throughout the 1990s. Subsequently, their populations generally suffered from increasing 
poverty rates. However, shocks’ withstanding, it appears that poverty rates were in 
decline in the medium-run.   
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Empirical Approach  
While a large number of countries have employed conditional cash transfer some 
have invested in it more heavily than others. While some CCT programs reach 40% of 
the nation’s citizens, others only cover a mere 5% of the population. Consequently, if 
CCT programs are efficient in remedying poverty permanently, one would expect to see 
that on average countries with the largest coverage achieve the greatest drops in 
inequality and poverty as well as the heftiest increases in school enrollment. This thesis 
aims to determine whether or not this was the case. It is unrealistic to expect this trend 
and the subsequent results to be straightforward.  There are a multitude of country 
specific factors such as economic recessions and political instability that come into play 
when making these determinations. However, the large array of countries included in the 
study should mitigate some of this variability.  
In order to capture the overall breadth of each program a variable, labeled “BP” 
was generated that represents a sum total of beneficiaries for each country. That is, a sum 
of the percent population that received aid from year to year. For example, if Guatemala 
began employing CCT in 2008 and covered 9, 8, and 10 percent of the population in the 
three years to come, their sum total would be 27%. This figure was then divided by 13 
(representing the 13 years between 1997 and 2010) to generate a yearly average. 
Furthermore, the regression includes the net change in Gini index (gini), net secondary 
school enrollment (ssn), gross secondary school enrollment (ssg), extreme poverty (ep), 
and moderate poverty (mp) from 1997 to 2010. These variables comprise the change 
between the first observation in 1997 and the last observation in 2010 in order to grasp 
the overall variation during the relevant timespan. This figure is also divided by thirteen 
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(representing the number of years) in order to come up with a yearly average change in 
inequality, poverty, and school enrollment.  
Subsequently, five different ordinary least square (OLS) regressions were run in 
order to grasp the effect that CCT program size had on the change in poverty, school 
enrollment, and poverty. Each regression aims to determine the effect of program size on 
each social development indicator. Subsequently the regressions stand as follows: 
(1) 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑃)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(2) 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑖 = 𝛼0 +  𝛽1(𝐵𝑃)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(3) 𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑃)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(4) 𝑒𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑃)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(5) 𝑚𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑃)𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Each regression is meant to determine the impact that “BP” or program coverage had 
on these indicators. Namely, the equation determines how much of the change in 
inequality, school enrollment, and poverty can be attributed to CCT programs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
Analysis of Results 
Figure #5: Regression Results  
 
Figure #5 summarizes the results for all five regressions. In the case of inequality, 
results are inconclusive. Namely, it is unclear whether or not countries that implemented 
the largest scale CCT initiatives underwent the most sizable decline in inequality. 
However, despite the lack of significance, the regression suggests there is a negative 
relationship between program breadth and inequality. For every annual unit increase in 
percent beneficiaries, Latin American countries could expect their Gini coefficient to 
decline by 1.16 percent each year.  
Despite the lack of significant results,86 it would be premature to conclude that 
conditional cash transfer initiatives fail to impact inequality. This regression only 
accounts for eighteen different observations as each one represents a single 
comprehensive value per country. It would be difficult to see significant results with such 
few data points. Additionally, although CCT initiatives are designed to eliminate poverty 
86 For the purpose of this thesis, a “p-value” of 10% or lower is statistically significant. Namely, there is a 
5% chance that the given relationship is caused by pure random chance. 
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permanently it is reasonable to expect a delay in the realization of these goals. However, 
the length of this study only spans 13 years. Therefore, it is possible that these 
shortcomings in data coupled with the recency of CCT programs account for the lack of 
conclusive results. However, as shown in Figure #6, most counties exhibited average 
annual drops in inequality, however slight.  
In the case of Mexico, the decrease of inequality was negligible despite being one 
of the countries with the largest CCT programs. As shown in Figure #6, Mexico’s 
inequality was only reduced by an average 0.13% despite benefiting around 19% of the 
population. Although this result is discouraging it is important to consider the fact that 
Mexico, underwent severe and prolonged economic distress at different point from 1997 
to 2010. It is somewhat promising to have seen a reduction in inequality, however slight, 
despite these structural changes in the Mexican economy. However, little can be 
concluded by analyzing this data alone.  
Figure #6: Regression (1) Scatter  
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In the case of school enrollment,87 results fail to be significant at the 90% level. 
Again, given the relevant data for 1997 and 2010, it is impossible to determine whether 
or not the countries that invested more heavily in conditional cash transfer managed to 
increase secondary school enrollment more on average from year to year. In this case, the 
regression results point to a negative relationship between gross secondary school 
enrollment and program breadth.  
However, it would be irresponsible to interpret this as meaning that CCT 
negatively impacts school enrollment. Instead, it is important to consider the fact that, as 
portrayed in Figure #7, most Latin American countries saw an increase in secondary 
school enrollment in the last two decades. However, some of the most economically 
stable and successful countries such as Chile underwent drastic leaps in modernization 
through the early 2000s whilst others fell behind. Therefore, despite having one of the 
smallest CCT programs, Chile’s school enrollment rates skyrocketed. However, it is 
evident that all countries saw annual increases in schooling as evidenced in the figure 
below despite being able to make such drastic jumps. However, it is impossible to 
reliably attribute this growth to conditional cash transfer programs. It might be the case 
that Latin American countries at large have focused more heavily in increasing school 
enrollment rates as a means of westernizing the population in recent years. Subsequently, 
despite seeing a rise in secondary school enrollment rates, this change cannot be reliably 
attributed to conditional cash transfer as there may be a series of other government 
initiatives tasked with doing this.   
87 I only analyze gross enrollment because trends and results are quite similar as are the variables and the 
added analysis appeared superfluous  
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Figure #7: Regression (3) Scatter  
 
 As seen in Figure #7, Mexico saw one of the largest rises in school enrollment 
when compared to other Latin American countries. Covering an average 19% of the 
population, Mexico’s enrollment rates went up by around 1.66% each year. Although 
results for Latin America as a whole are inconclusive, this results hint at the possibility of 
Progresa, one of the lengthiest and most extensive programs, having a positive impact on 
school enrollment. In fact, save a few outliers such as Costa Rica, where school 
enrollment rose by a staggering average of 3.8% annually despite having a small CCT 
program, some of the countries with the largest CCT program breadth saw the largest 
increases in enrollment. This finding is not surprising due to the fact that individual 
countries might have enacted a multitude of other development initiatives to complement 
CCT. However, this does not render CCT necessarily inefficient as results are still 
inconclusive.    
In terms of extreme poverty, the regression rendered significant results at the 95% 
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in a 2.77% decrease in extreme poverty from year to year. When considering the context 
of CCT programs, this result is not surprising. Conditional cash transfers, by design, 
prioritize aiding the nation’s poorest in the most remote rural regions. In fact, one of the 
main advantages of these initiatives is the relative ease with which administrators can 
reach the most marginalized members of the general population. Thereafter, the fact that 
Latin American CCT programs were most evidently successful in reducing severe 
poverty in comparison to nationwide inequality and school enrollment rates.   
Figure #8: Regression (4) Scatter  
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Mexico, Bolivia, and Brazil saw some of the largest reductions in extreme poverty rates. 
This result implies that a Latin American country’s investment in CCT programs is 
directly related to success in combating extreme poverty.  
 In the case of Mexico, the country saw the largest drop in extreme poverty at a 
yearly average of 1.43% as shown in Figure #8. Mexico, a pioneer in conditional cash 
transfer, has invested more heftily than most other Latin American countries in these 
programs. Additionally, the Mexican CCT initiative is one of the oldest along with 
Brazil. This finding indicates that counties might be able to drastically decrease the 
percent of the population living under dire circumstances of poverty by investing in CCT 
programs over the long run. It is important to note that Mexico was able to consistently 
reduce extreme poverty despite being heavily impacted by the financial crisis of 2007.  
 In terms of moderate poverty, the regression results were once again inconclusive 
with no statistical significance at the 10% level. Although moderate poverty has generally 
decreased in Latin America, this change cannot be reliably attributed to CCT programs. 
However, the model’s slope hints at a negative relationship between conditional cash 
transfer and moderate poverty. The slope indicates that by increasing average 
beneficiaries by one percent a country could expect to see a 2.69% fall in moderate 
poverty. However, there is yet to be sufficient evidence to either corroborate or disprove 
this assumption being CCT programs are fairly young. It is difficult to analyze the long-
term effects of such initiatives. However, the fact that countries have tended to see a drop 
in percent working poor as shown in Figure #9, is encouraging.  
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Figure #9: Regression (5) Scatter  
 
 As portrayed in Figure #9, Mexico underwent the largest average annual decrease 
in moderate poverty. Similar to extreme poverty this finding is encouraging being that 
Progresa-Oportunidades is one of the oldest and most expensive CCT initiatives. 
However, because results are inconclusive, this reduction cannot be justifiably attributed 
to this program. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Mexico was consistently 
successful in reducing poverty rates despite undergoing a series of political and economic 
crises. Conditional cash transfers might be making the country’s poor more resilient to 
nationwide financial distress. However, I cannot prove this within the constraints of my 
data.   
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Conclusion  
 Conditional cash transfer programs have only been present in the social welfare 
schemes of nations for the past eighteen years. However, they have become vital in 
defeating Latin American poverty and inequality. Motivated by the apparent success of 
Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades and Brazil’s Bolsa Escola in the late 1990s, a 
multitude of Latin American counties adopted CCT initiatives.  
In a majority of cases, CCT programs have proved to be a rapid and efficient 
panacea to a plethora of social development issues such as high poverty rates and low 
school enrollment rates. Additionally, due in large part to rigorous data collection by 
administrators, the triumphs of these programs become apparent early on. By targeting 
the poorest individuals in remote areas CCT initiatives easily accomplish large 
milestones when it comes to their beneficiaries. The extremely poor, by definition, lack 
access to the most basic good such as water and food and consequently by granting them 
a minute stipend their condition can be significantly improved.  Consequently, these 
programs have been asserted as being more successful than the traditional welfare model. 
Additionally, a large number of Latin American countries adopted these schemes when 
the nation’s poor faced particularly dire conditions due to economic recessions or 
political instability. 
However, the medium and long run success of these programs is yet to be seen. 
Although conditional cash transfer programs are designed to fulfill the hefty goal of 
breaking with poverty cycles, the recency of a majority of initiatives coupled with 
complications in conducting longitudinal studies make the studying of these effects 
challenging. Consequently, it is unclear whether or not CCT programs are merely a better 
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yet flawed alternative to past initiatives or if they are in fact a sustainable panacea to the 
age old problems of poverty and inequality. Nevertheless, a large number of Latin 
American counties have allotted a large portion of their resources in partaking in 
conditional cash transfer.  
Thereafter, this paper attempts to address some of these questions. In order to 
shed light on the impact of conditional cash transfer in both the short and medium run, 
this thesis focuses on Mexico’s experience. A pioneer in conditional cash transfer, 
Mexico’s CCT experience is deeply intertwined with the history of conditional cash 
transfer itself.  Furthermore, as one of the oldest and largest CCT programs in Latin 
America, Progresa-Oportunidades is a relevant example in the motivation, administration, 
and impact of such initiatives over an extended time period. Furthermore, the case of 
Mexico is especially relevant when considering that many Latin American countries 
modeled their pertinent program on Mexico’s innovative Progresa program.  
Moreover, this thesis aims to analyze whether or not CCT programs that cover the 
largest chunks of the population have been more successful in reducing poverty and 
inequality and increasing school enrollment rates within a thirteen year span. If 
conditional cash transfer programs are more efficient than their conventional welfare 
counterparts then the largest programs would have seen the most dramatic change in 
terms of these metrics. Although regression results were inconclusive in terms of 
moderate poverty, secondary school enrollment, and inequality there is overwhelming 
evidence that conditional cash transfers have been incredibly successful in combating 
extreme poverty. That is, the countries with the largest percent population coverage have 
been the most successful in helping families out of the most severe forms of poverty.  
60 
 
These results are not surprising when considering the structure and design of CCT 
programs. These initiatives explicitly target and prioritize each nation’s poorest 
individuals. Subsequently, programs are extremely successful in lifting these individuals 
out of their situations. Although this is an impressive milestone when contemplating the 
fact that a large number of previous welfare initiatives failed to reach this marginalized 
population a lot remains unclear in terms of the at large success or failure of CCT 
initiatives. Nevertheless, it would be irresponsible to conclude conditional cash transfer 
programs inefficient in reducing inequality and poverty and increasing school enrollment. 
A majority of CCT initiatives are fairly young thus conclusive results remain pending.   
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